Though the Bush administration has now agreed to reopen talks with North Korea, it has set demands far broader than those pressed by President Bill Clinton, raising the prospect of protracted negotiations while Pyongyang continues to sell missiles around the world.
Just six months ago, American and North Korean diplomats appeared to be closing in on a deal to ban the development, production and sale of North Korean missiles. But now, reacting to the changed signals from Washington, North Korea has also publicly staked out a tough stance.
The two sides have yet to set a date for high-level talks. And Bush administration aides have told the South Koreans that the chances of Pyongyang's agreeing to all of its demands are low.
Some senior Bush administration officials hope that economic pressures will lead North Korea to seek a far-reaching accommodation with the West. But some experts worry that unless both sides indicate a willingness to compromise, the result may be deadlock while North Korea exports medium-range or even long- range missiles. In the face of a prolonged stalemate, they say, North Korea might also threaten to resume testing long-range missiles, thereby developing the means to strike the United States.
The basic position of the Bush administration, worked out after an intensive review, is that an accord that focuses on missiles is no longer sufficient. Only a comprehensive program to limit North Korea's military potential, administration officials say, can serve as a foundation for improved relations with the West. So North Korea must make simultaneous concessions on nuclear issues and conventional arms, and any missile agreement must be subject to extensive verification.
"We need to see some progress in all areas," a senior administration official said. "We are prepared to wait. We don't feel any urgency to provide goodies to them in response to their rhetoric or threats."
But while the administration is demanding more from North Korea, it has spoken in only general terms about what economic and political benefits it is prepared to give in return.
North Korea, for its part, is now insisting on millions of dollars in aid to ease a chronic electricity shortage and has put pressure on Washington by freezing its relationship with South Korea. And it has shown no sign of stopping its missile sales.
Continued sales by North Korea would be a worrisome development for the United States. The administration has cited the missile threat from "rogue states" in trying to build international support for an antimissile defense.
"It makes sense for the administration to try to get progress on all of the issues they have identified: missile, nuclear and conventional," said Gary Samore, a senior fellow at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies who was a top aide for proliferation issues on President Clinton's National Security Council.
"But that is going to be difficult to achieve, especially in the absence of clear inducements," Mr. Samore said. "If a comprehensive package is not possible, the administration should look at a stand-alone deal on missile exports because the North Koreans are actively selling missiles around the world, especially to the Middle East."
With a million-man army, nuclear expertise and missile factories, North Korea has long been a major worry for the United States. Acting at the advice of former Defense Secretary William J. Perry, the Clinton administration stressed the importance of focusing on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.
The reasoning was that those programs created new dangers for the United States, and that Washington had long experience in deterring North Korea's conventional military threat.
In 1994, the Clinton administration and North Korea worked out an "agreed framework," in which Pyongyang agreed to freeze its plutonium production program and eventually to dismantle it. In return, the United States agreed to replace North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors with two light-water reactors, which are less useful in making bomb-grade material.
Under that understanding, North Korea also agreed to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect several suspected nuclear waste sites and place any undeclared plutonium stockpiles under international safeguards.
Those steps are deemed necessary because the West suspects that North Korea has separated more plutonium than it has acknowledged — perhaps enough for one or two bombs' worth in all. Under the agreement, North Korea is required to cooperate with the energy agency once a "significant portion" of the light-water reactors is completed.
Having frozen Pyongyang's nuclear program, the Clinton administration turned its attention to North Korea's missile program. In 1999, North Korea agreed to suspend tests of long-range missiles like the Taepo Dong-1 missile that it test-fired in August 1998. Pyongyang has extended that moratorium through 2003.
In the final year of his presidency, Mr. Clinton sought to negotiate a broader accord that would end North Korea's production of medium- and long-range missiles, as well as the export of missile technology.
To compensate the North Koreans, the Clinton administration offered a presidential trip to Pyongyang, which would signify a new political relationship between the two countries, as well as hundreds of millions of dollars in annual food aid and other assistance. Mr. Clinton also agreed to a North Korean proposal to provide two or three free launches of North Korean civilian satellites annually. But time ran out before the deal could be nailed down.
The Bush administration initially refused to continue the talks with North Korea, saying it needed to conduct a review. That policy distressed President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea, who had initiated a "sunshine policy" aimed at ending the hostility on the Korean peninsula and who has been hoping for a second summit meeting with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il.
After completing its assessment in early June, the Bush administration decided to re-engage with North Korea. Many commentators concluded that pressure from South Korea and anxious European allies, as well as coaxing from Mr. Bush's father, had led the new administration to temper its hard-line instincts and continue engaging Pyongyang.
